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SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON THE BURDEN OF
PROOF IN DEMONSTRATING A VIOLATION
OF THE GENERAL DUTY CLAUSE OF OSHA:
NATIONAL REALTY
EDWIN C. SATTER HI*
The general duty clause of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA or the Act)' requires each employer2 to "furnish
to each of his employees employment and a place of employment
which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees . . . ." 3 The
general duty clause has been the subject of much debate among
legislators, administrative law judges, commissioners, and in-
terested observers—not to mention employers. What is the scope of
the duty? To whom does it apply and what does it cover? Whose
judgment controls? These are but a few of the myriad questions
which have arisen concerning this seemingly innocuous and
straightforward provision of OSHA.
The Occupational Safety and Health Act has as its central
purpose "to assure so far as possible every working man and woman
in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions and to preserve
our human resources . . . ."4
 The highly significant part that the
general duty clause was to play in the effort to achieve these goals
was presaged by the many debates which dealt with the wording by
* Director of Judicial Administration, Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1970).
2
 The definition of "employer" in OSHA is extremely broad: "The term 'employer' means
a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees . . ." 29 U.S.C. §
652(5) (1970) (emphasis added). This language indicates that the coverage of the Act is
designed to be as extensive as possible. Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 492 F.2d 1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1974).
3
 OSHA § 5(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970).
• OSHA § 2(b), 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1970).
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which the duty was to be expressed. 5 Although the precise scope of
the duty is not yet clearly delineated, certain indications as to its
nature may be gleaned from the legislative history of the clause. As
stated in the committee report which accompanied the Senate
version 6 of the Act (and which substantially embodied the Act as
ultimately passed):
The committee has concluded that such a provision is
based on sound and reasonable policy. Under principles of
common law, individuals are obliged to refrain from ac-
tions which cause harm to others. Courts often refer to this
as a general duty to others. Statutes usually increase but
sometimes modify this duty. The committee believes that
employers are equally bound by this general and common
duty to bring no adverse effects to the life and health of
employees throughout the course of their employment.
Employers have primary control of the work environment
and should insure that it is safe and healthful. Section 5(a),
in providing that employers must furnish employment
"which is free from recognized hazards so as to provide
safe and healthful working conditions," merely restates
that each employer shall furnish this degree of care. 7
This stated relationship between the general duty clause and the
common law has caused some confusion, both before and after
enactment. 8 One definite difference from the common law approach
is the unavailability under the general duty clause of the common
See, e.g., 116 Cong. Rec. 42206 (1970) (remarks of Representative Steiger). See also
American Smelting & Ref. Co., CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide ill 16,456, at 21, 329 n.9
(Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 10) (dissenting opinion); 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5222-23 (Individual views of Senator Javits); Morey, The General Duty Clause of
the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 990-91 (1973).
Indeed, many provisions of the Act aroused strenuous and, at times, bitter debate. See,
e.g., Moran, A Critique of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 67 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 200-01 (1972). See also BNA, The Job Safety and Health Act of 1970, 13-21 (1971);
Gross, The Occupational Safety and Health Act Much Ado About Something, 3 Loyola Chi.
L.J.- 247, 249-51 (1972); 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5218-19 (Individual views of
Senator Javits).
S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5177-5227. The Senate version was S. 2193; the House version was H.R. 16785.
' S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News 5177, 5186.
8 See, e.g., 116 Cong. Rec. 38382-83 (1970); National Realty & Constr, Co. v. Occupa-
tional Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.34 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Although
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission [hereinafter referred to as the
Review Commission or the Commission] is named as the defendant in National Realty, supra,
considerable controversy exists as to the status of the Review Commission as a party before
the court of appeals. See, Moran, Parties to Proceedings in the Court of Appeals Under the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 15 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1089 (1974).
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law defenses such as contributory negligence, fellow servant negli-
gence, and assumption of risky Ultimately, it appears that the
general duty clause is designed to serve a dual purpose: to place an
affirmative duty upon the employer—which duty could be enforced
via penalties before injuries occurred"—and to cover situations for
which no standards have been promulgated by the Secretary of
Labor." This duty is not to be construed as absolute 2
 "The duty
was to be an achievable one." 13
Since OSHA is still in its infancy, the terrain which it covers is
still largely unexplored. However, some illumination has recently
been shed which facilitates the resolution of some of the knotty
interpretive problems concerning the general duty clause. In Na-
tional Realty & Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Commission," the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed a decision of the Review Commission
which had imposed a penalty on National Realty for a "serious
violation" of the general duty clause. 15
 The events, which culmi-
9
 National Realty & Constr. Co., 11971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 1i 15,188,
at 20,265, 20,267 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 85). But see Morey, supra note
5, at 1004-05.
1°
 See 116 Cong. Rec. 38383 (1970) (Remarks of Representative Hathaway).
11
 See 116 Cong. Rec. 42206 (1970) (Remarks of Representative Steiger). See also Brisk
Waterproofing Co., CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide 11 16,345, at 21,261 (Review Comm'n
1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 1046). The Secretary of Labor may issue specific standards under
OSHA § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970), which employers and employees are required to observe.
OSHA §§ 5(a)(2), (b), 29 U.S.C. §§ 654(a)(2), (b) (1970).
When specific standards are promulgated by the Secretary, they take precedence over any
general standard applicable to the same condition. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1910.5(c)(1), (1) (1973). Brisk
Waterproofing, supra. See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1261 n.9.
12 National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265-66. See Engstrum & Nourse, 11971-19731 CCH
Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 11 15,468, at 20,742 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No,
74) (dissenting opinion).
As stated in the House report on an earlier version of OSHA:
An employer's duty under 'the general duty clause) is not an absolute one. It is the
Committee's intent that an employer exercise care to furnish a safe and healthful
place to work and to provide safe tools and equipment. This is not a vague duty, but
is protection of the worker from preventable dangers.
H.R. Rep. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2ci Sess. (1970), reprinted in BNA, The Job Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 159 (1971), See also 116 Cong. Rec. 38371-72 (1970) (remarks of
Representative Steiger).
13
 National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266.
489 F,2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
13
 Id. at 1260. "Serious violation" is defined in § 17 of the Act, 29 U.S.C. 666(j) (1970).
Section 17 specifies the penalties which may be imposed for violations of OSHA's provisions.
For violations of the general duty clause or of any standard, rule or order promulgated
pursuant to § 6, 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1970), the employer: (a) may be assessed a penalty up to
$10,000 for each violation which is willful or repeated; (b) must be assessed a penalty, up to
$1,000, for a serious violation for which the employer received a citation; (c) may be assessed a
penalty up to $1,000 for a non-serious violation for which the employer received a citation. 29
U.S.C. §§ 666(a)-(c) (1970). An employer may be subjected to criminal sanctions for aggra-
vated violations, 29 U.S.C. §§ 666(e)-(g) (1970).
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nated in a citation"' and penalty against National Realty, are as
follows." O.C. Smith, a foreman of National Realty, was riding
upon the running board of a front end loader operated by a subordi-
nate at a construction site. As the loader began to descend an
earthen ramp, the engine stalled; the loader began to accelerate and
swerve. Smith jumped off the machine but was killed when it fell on
top of him. After an investigation, the Secretary issued a citation for
violation of the general duty clause, asserting that the employer
(National Realty) had
failed] to provide his employee employment which was
free from recognized hazards which caused and were likely
to cause death or serious physical harm to his employees in
that an employee was permitted to stand as a passenger on
the running board of a . . front end loader while the
loader was in motion."
The Secretary also proposed a penalty of $800.
When National Realty contested the citation and penalty, the
Secretary filed a formal complaint essentially restating the violation
charged in the citation. The Review Commission thereupon ap-
pointed a hehring examiner (now called an administrative law
judge)" to take evidence and dispose of the case. At the hearing,
one of Smith's supervisors, who had not seen the accident, testified
that it was against company policy for passengers to ride on con-
struction equipment and that foreman Smith's own safety record
was very good. In addition, the supervisor stated that, in each of the
"4 or 5" instances of equipment riding in the prior two year period,
he had reprimanded the offenders and threatened them with dis-
Under the original Senate bill, there was to be no penalty assessed for a violation of the
general duty clause; the employer was to be charged with a fine only for failure to correct a
condition after being served with notice of a violation. S. Rep. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess., (1970) reprinted in 1970 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5177, 5186, 5192-93.
16 The Secretary of Labor is authorized to issue citations for violations of OSHA. OSHA
§ 9, 29 U.S.C. § 658 (1970). Penalties may be imposed in connection with any violation for
which a citation has issued. OSHA § 17, 29 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). See note 15 supra.
17 The facts have been compiled from the Hearing Examiner's Report, National Realty
& Constr. Co., [1971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs, ¶ 15,028, at 20,031, and the
Review Commission's decision, National Realty & Constr. Co., [1971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety
& Health Decs. 15,188, at 20,263 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 85).
Is 489 F.2d at 1261 n.11.
" As provided for in §§ 10(c) and 12(j) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 659(c) and 661(i) (1970).
The hearing must be conducted in accordance with § 5 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5
U.S.C. § 554 (1970) (but without regard to § 654(0(3)). After the judge's decision at the
hearing, a unique provision of OSHA provides that the judge's order automatically becomes
final in 30 days unless one of the three commissioners directs that it shall be reviewed by the
Commission. OSHA § 12(j), 29 U.S.C. § 661(i) (1970). Any person adversely affected or
aggrieved by a final order of the Commission has the right of appeal to a circuit court of
appeals. OSHA § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. 660(a) (1970).
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charge for any subsequent violation; there had been no second
offense by any employee. The hearing examiner dismissed the cita-
tion and penalty because, in his view, the Secretary had failed to
prove that National Realty had "permitted" the hazard to exist or
that it had "permitted" Smith to ride the loader. The hearing ex-
aminer found that the few occasions on which equipment riding did
occur demonstrated that these were rare and isolated instances and
were not the result of permission: a company did not permit an
activity which its safety policies prohibited unless the policies were
not enforced or were not effective. Such constructive permission
could be found only if the hazardous activity were a "practice"
rather than a rare occurrence.
The Review Commission, 2-1, reversed the hearing examiner
and affirmed the citation (but reduced the penalty). 2 ° Commissioner
Burch found that National Realty had breached the general duty
clause by "permitting, or failing to prevent" 2 ' the hazard, and
Commissioner Van Namee found a violation in that National Realty
had not "effectively implemented" 22 policy against equipment
riding. Each of the majority commissioners suggested possible im-
provements in National Realty's safety program. Chairman Moran
dissented23 on the grounds that: (a) the Secretary had not proven his
charge that National Realty had "permitted" either equipment rid-
ing in general or the particular incident which caused Smith's death;
(b) the Secretary had failed to prove that equipment riding was a
"recognized hazard" within the meaning of section 5(a)(1); and (c)
the construction company had been penalized upon the basis that it
had "failed to prevent" the foreman's unsafe act, something with
which it had never been charged.
Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the court of appeals, based
the reversal of the Review Commission's decision on the ground that
the Secretary of Labor had failed to carry his burden of proof in the
case. 24 The court emphasized the fact that it was dealing here with
the Secretary's burden of production; 25 where the Secretary had
produced "substantial evidence" which will support a Commission
finding, the Commission's view on the preponderance of the evi-
dence (the burden of persuasion) is not reviewable by the court of
20
 [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs.	 15,188, at 20,266.
21
 Id. at 20,265.
22 Id. at 20,268 (concurring opinion).
25
 Id, at 20,268-71 (dissenting opinion).
24
 489 F,2d at 1268. The Secretary of Labor has the burden of proof as to each element
in establishing a violation. 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1973).
25
 489  F.2c1 at 1263 n.24. See Secretary of Labor v. Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co.,
[1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. ¶ 15,047, at 20,074-75 (Admin. Law Judge
1972), aff'd and modified, [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Dees. ¶ 15,687, at 20,978
(Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 1).
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appeals. 26 Judge Wright succinctly laid out a burden of proof rule
consisting of three elements to establish a violation of the general
duty clause: the Secretary is required to prove that the employer
failed to (a) render his workplace "free" of a hazard which was (b)
"recognized," and (c) "causing or likely to cause death or serious
physical harm."27 Unless the record revealed "substantial evidence"
to support each of these elements, a finding of violation could not be
upheld. Since the court found that there was substantial evidence to
support the Commission's finding that the hazard of riding heavy
equipment was "recognized" and "likely to cause death or serious
physical harm," it did not discuss these elements further. 28 The
remaining question, which was one of first impression for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, 29 was whether National Realty had ren-
dered its construction site "free" of the recognized hazard. This
comment will explore each of the three elements; the recognition and
injury potential elements will be discussed first, followed by an
exposition of Judge Wright's treatment of the remaining burden of
proof element.
There has been much disagreement among the commissioners
as to what constitutes a "recognized" hazard. In numerous cases
raising this issue, a majority of commissioners has relied upon
standards which had been promulgated but were not yet effective, 3 °
26
 489 F.2d at 1263 n.24. See OSHA § 11(a), 29 U.S.C. § 660(a) (1970).
27
 489 F.2d at 1265. With respect to the charge itself, the court found that the wording
was "doubly unfortunate" in that permission "usually connotes knowing consent, which is not
a necessary element of a general duty violation," and because "the charge overemphasized a
single incident rather than directly indicting the adequacy of National Realty's safety precau-
tions regarding equipment riding." Id. at 1264. Nevertheless, the court found that the charge
was not so deficient so as to preclude the Secretary from litigating the adequacy of National
Realty's safety program under the general duty clause. Under the circumstances of the case,
the word permitted "could fairly have been read to suggest merely a wrongful failure to
prevent" the Smith incident; in any event, any deficiencies or ambiguities in the charge could
have been rectified at the hearing. "So long as fair notice is afforded, an issue litigated at an
administrative hearing may be decided by the hearing agency even though the formal
pleadings did not squarely raise the issue." Id. Judge Wright maintained that this was in
accord with "the familiar rule that administrative pleadings are very liberally construed and
very easily amended." Id.
However, observe that, although the pleadings did survive judicial scrutiny, the Secre-
tary ultimately failed to cure the defects since National Realty was not properly informed at
the hearing of the precise charges against it. See text at notes 77-79 infra.
28 489 F.2d at 1265.
26 Id.
3°
 American Smelting & Ref. Co., CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide 11 16,456, at
21,326 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 10), appeal filed, CCH Empl. Safety &
,Health Guide 5923 (8th Cir., Nov. 16, 1973); M.A. Swatek & Co., [1971-1973] CCH Occ.
Health Decs. 11 15,672, at 20,954 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No, 33); R.D. Blue
Constr., Inc., [1971-1973] CCH Oct. Safety & Health Decs. 1] 15,417, at 20,649 (Review
Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 19); Hidden Valley Corp., 11971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety &
Health Decs. ¶ 15,035, at 20,047 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No, 11). Chairman
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or upon state standards of which the employer was aware, 3 ' or upon
the commissioner's own expert opinion in the absence of - such relev-
ant finding of fact by the administrative law judge, 32 as proof that a
given situation constituted a recognized hazard.
In National Realty & Construction Co., the Commission major-
ity had no difficulty in "recognizing" the hazard. In the decision,
Commissioner Burch stated: "We believe the danger inherent in
falling from construction equipment onto wheels which have no
mud guards or under the wheels when travelling on uneven terrain
common on construction sites, is not only a recognized, but an
Moran dissented in each of these decisions: American Smelting, supra, at 21,328; Swatek,
supra, at 20,960; Blue, supra, at 20,649; Hidden Valley, supra, 20,048. In each case Chair-
man Moran maintained that the use of promulgated but not yet effective standards to
establish a violation was improper and, since the Secretary had not introduced evidence to
prove that a "recognized" hazard existed, he had failed to meet his burden of proof.
Perhaps the preferred method for dealing with these cases would be to subsequently
amend the citation and complaint to allege violation of the standard which may have become
effective in the interim. Chairman Moran in his dissent in American Smelling, supra, at
21,330, and Judge Wright in National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1264-65 n.31, suggest the propriety
of such a procedure. See Brisk Waterproofing Co., CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide ¶
16,345, at 21,260 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 1046); Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b),
permitting amendment. But see B. Heckerman Iron Works, Inc., CCH Empl. Safety &
Health Guide 11 16,371, at 21,274 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 111), appeal
filed, CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide 5937 (2d Cir., Nov. 7, 1973), where the Commis-
sion affirmed a judge's decision refusing to allow the Secretary to amend his complaint to
allege a general duty violation when the Secretary had initially proceeded upon a specific
standard subsequently held to be inapplicable. Id..at 21,274 (dissenting opinion). Sec also Sun
Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. \ CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide 11 16,725, at 21,474 (Review
Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 161) where Commissioner Cleary stated that the Secretary
should be permitted to cite and plead in the alternative under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(1)(2) even
though the general duty citation will be inapplicable if the specific standard applies. Id. at
21,475 (concurring opinion).
Furthermore, it should be noted that the employer has a number of options open to him
when he is found to be in violation of a specific standard, which options are not available to
him if he is found in violation of the general duty clause. See OSHA § 6(b)(6), 29 U.S.C. §
655(b)(6}, (d) (1970).
ai Engstrum & Nourse, [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 11 15,123, at
20,192 (Admin. Law Judge 1972), aff'd, 11971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. ¶
15,468, at 20,741 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 74). Chairman Moran dissented
from the use of a state standard, with which the employer was familiar, to establish a
"recognized" hazard; he stated that OSHA was enacted to promote uniform national stand-
ards and that reliance upon state standards raises the specter of unequal federal enforcement.
11971-1973) CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. ¶ 15,468, at 20,743 (dissenting opinion).
32 Secretary of Labor v. Dale M. Madden Constr., Inc., [1971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety &
Health Decs. 11 15,048, at 20,097 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 9), appeal filed,
id. at 20,099 (9th Cir., May 17, 1972); Ernest F. Donley's Sons, Inc., [1971-1973] CCH Occ.
Safety & Health Decs. ¶ 15,628, at 20,913 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 43);
Broadview Constr. Co. [1971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. ¶ 15,399, at 20,603
(Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 124), aff'g Hearing Examiner's opinion, id. at
20,606. Charman Moran dissented from the latter two cases asserting that finding a violation
was improper where the hearing examiner had made no finding of fact, as required by OSHA
§ 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 659(c) (1970), as to one of the essential elements of the violation, viz., that
the hazard was "recognized." Donley's Sons, supra, at 20,915; Broadview, supra, at 20,606.
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obvious hazard." 33
 Chairman Moran, on the other hand, found the
Secretary's evidence on this point too scanty and pointed out that
the sole proof offered by the Secretary was the statement by his
compliance officer that the Army Corps of Engineers had a general
safety rule prohibiting passengers on such equipment. 34 Chairman
Moran would therefore vacate the citation. 35
The Commission has also found that the basis of hazard recog-
nition is not a question of the knowledge or lack thereof of the
individual employer, but of the knowledge of the industry as a
whole with respect to the hazard. In Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc., 36
the Commission, with one dissent, held an employer not responsible
for a violation of the general duty since the record was devoid of any
evidence that the hazard involved—hydrogen sulfide gas generated
by decomposing proteinaceous material—constituted a hazard
commonly known or "recognized" by employers in the respondent's
industry." The Commission majority specifically stated that the
issue was not whether the employer was personally aware of the
hazard, but whether the hazard was recognized in the industry
generally; if the hazard was not widely recognized in the industry,
there could be no violation of the general duty clause. 38 On petition
for review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this reason-
ing and instead agreed with the Commission dissent. The court
found that "examination of the Act's legislative history clearly indi-
cates that the term recognized was chosen by Congress not to
exclude actual knowledge, but rather to include the generally recog-
nized knowledge of the industry as well." 39 Under this line of
reasoning, the standard for "recognition" becomes a question of
whether the employer knew or should have known of the hazard,
i.e., awareness based upon personal knowledge or industry
standards."' In either case, the test is objective.'" In National
33
 National Realty & Constr. Co., [1971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs.
15,188, at 20,264-65 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 85).
34 Id. at 20,270 (dissenting opinion).
31
 Id. at 20,271 (dissenting opinion).
36 11971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Dees. 11 15,488, at 20,772 (Review Comm'n
1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 31).
37
 Id. at 20,773.
36 Id. at 20,774.
39 Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir.
1974).
4° See Morey, supra note 5, at 1002. The District of Columbia Circuit's remarks in
National Really, 489 F.2d at 1265, are not inconsistent with the Eighth Circuit's opinion in
Brennan v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 494 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1974). In
National Realty, the court was not presented with the actual knowledge issue. The conclusion
that an employer's actual knowledge of the existence of a hazard would be sufficient to
constitute recognition under the general duty clause is consonant with the objective test in
National Realty. See 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32. Arguably, it would be quite inconsistent with the
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Realty, the court, which was not confronted with the actual know-
ledge issue, 42 stated that the standard for recognition would be "the
common knowledge of safety experts who are familiar with the
circumstances of the industry or the activity in question." 43 From
this, it could be inferred that a showing of disagreement among
safety experts may put a considerably greater burden of proof upon
the Secretary.
Another issue in the recognition area is whether the general
duty clause is intended to cover non-obvious" hazardous conditions
which can be detected only by instrumentation or if only those
hazards which can be detected by the unaided human senses come
within its purview. In American Smelting & Refining, 45 the Com-
mission held that "recognized hazards" under the general duty pro-
vision included health hazards which could be detected only by.
instrumentation." Chairman Moran vigorously dissented from the
majority determination in the case, and quoted the interpretation of
the general duty clause contained in the final draft of the bill which
became OSHA:
The conference bill, takes the approach of this House
to the general duty requirement that an employer maintain
a safe and healthful working environment. The
conference-reported bill recognizes the need for such a
provision where there is no existing specific standard ap-
plicable to a given situation. However, this requirement is
made realistic by its application only to those situations
where there are 'recognized hazards' which are likely to
cause or are causing serious injury or death. Such hazards
are the type that can readily be detected on the basis of the
basic human senses. Hazards which require technical or
stated purposes of OSHA, see text at note 4 supra, to allow an employer to escape liability,
despite actual knowledge of a hazard, merely because the form of the danger was so unusual
that safety experts might not yet be cognizant of it.
41 See National Really, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32.
42 See note 40 supra.
43 489 F.2d at 1265 n.32. Query whether a violation could be found even if the experts
were unanimous in the opinion that a hazard did not exist, but a perhaps more reasonably
objective consideration would indeed recognize a definite hazard. Sec The T.J. Hooper, 60
F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932).
44 "Non-obvious" could reasonably be interpreted to signify hazards which are not
patently obvious but could be detected with the human senses upon a reasonably thorough
investigation. However, the majority in American Smelting appears to interpret "non-
obvious" as any hazard which cannot be detected through the unaided human senses. CCH
Empl. Safety & Health Guide ill 16,456, at 21,327 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No.
10).
43 Id. at 21,326,
46 Id. at 21,327.
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testing devices to detect them are not intended to be within
the scope of the general duty requirement. 47
This statement by Representative Steiger evidences a concern which
he expressed repeatedly during the consideration of this legislation.
Earlier, in debate on the House version of the Act, he remarked:
If we are to include any sort of general-care duty in this
legislation, . . we should also limit its terms so that
persons upon whom it would impose a duty are not un-
justly held accountable for situations of which they are
completely unaware."
The decision in American Smelting would seem to be contrary to the
intent of Representative Steiger who was a major figure involved in
the development of OSHA.
Even though a hazardous condition may exist, such as exces-
sive levels of airborne lead particles as in American Smelting, the
solution of the problem may require investigation as to feasibility
and other factors. 49
 Furthermore, the Secretary always has the
option to immediately establish emergency temporary standards if
the employees are exposed to grave danger as a result of the
hazard. 5 ° The court in National Realty pointed out that where the
employer "had no notice, i.e., no duty to know, that its safety
regime was defective," the proper course of action for the Secretary
and the Commission might be to impose a zero penalty coupled with
an abatement order. 5 '
Another element in the proof of a violation of the general duty
requirement is proof that the recognized hazard is "causing or likely
to cause death or serious physical harm."52 As in National Realty,
the court will usually defer to the Commission's expertise in the
resolution of this issue.
If evidence is presented that a practice could eventuate in
serious physical harm upon other than a freakish or utterly
implausible occurrence of circumstances, the Commission's
45 Id. at 21,328 (dissenting opinion), quoting from 116 Cong. Rec. 42206 (1970) (Remarks
of Representative Steiger on the Conf. Rep. on S. 2193).
" 116 Cong. Rec. 38371 (1970) (Remarks of Representative Steiger).
49 See the many factors which the Secretary must consider in devising specified stan-
dards. OSHA § 6(6)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 655(6)(5) (1970).
5° OSHA § 6(c), 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1970). See American Smelting, CCH Empl. Safety &
Health Guide ¶ 16,456, at 21,329 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 10) (dissenting
opinion); Brisk Waterproofing Co., CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide ¶ 16,345, at 21,261
(Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 1046).
51 489 F.2d at 1268 n.41.
52 OSHA § 5(a}(1), 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1} (1970).
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expert determination of likelihood should be accorded con-
siderable deference by the courts. 53
Implicit in the Commission's decision in National Realty & Con-
struction Co. 54 is the principle that, for a serious violation to exist, it
is not necessary that the probability be high that a hazard will result
in an accident—i.e., that the accident be likely to occur—but rather
that, if an accident resulting from the hazard should occur, there
would be a substantial probability that serious injuries or death
would result. 55
The final element in the Secretary's burden of proof, but
perhaps the most significant, is proof that the employer did not
render his place of employment "free" 56 from recognized hazards
likely to result in severe injuries. The Commission has actually dealt
with this element but in a rather general way. The Commission has
found that an unforeseen occurrence falls outside the scope of the
general duty clause. 57 In Norman R. Bratcher Co., 58 a painting
contractor was cited for a violation of the general duty clause after
one of his employees was electrocuted when an aluminum ladder he
was using came into contact with a power line. Two of the
respondent's employees had found that an 18 foot extension ladder
which they sought to use would not extend to the required length. In
order to work on it, they moved the ladder some distance from the
building they were to paint and thereafter raised the ladder in such
' 3 489 F.2d at 1265 n.33. See Morey, supra note 5, at 997-98.
54 [1971-19731 CCH Oct. Safety & Health Decs.	 15,188, at 20,265 (Review Comm'n
1972) (OSHRC Doe. No. 85).
55 See National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1265 n.33. OSHA is preventative legislation; there-
fore, the Commission may penalize a company for failing to prevent a hazardous condition
even though no injuries have resulted. Sec id. at 1260 n.6; OSHA § 2, 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1970).
The "degree of probability of occurrence of an injury" is an element of the "gravity" of
the violation, which, among other factors, the Commission should take into consideration in
determining the size of the penalty to be assessed. National Realty & Constr. Co., [1971-1973]
CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 15,188, at 20,266 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doe.
No. 85).
If there is a "substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could result from
a condition which exists, or , practices . . . in use, in such place of employment ." the
employer may be cited for a serious violation, subject to a due diligence defense. OSHA §
17(k), 29 U.S.C. § 666(j) (1970); see note 15 supra. The distinction between determinations of
"gravity" and "seriousness" of a violation was clarified in Natkin & Co., [1971-1973] CCH
Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 15,679, at 20,967 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No.
401). From this decision it appears that there may be a serious violation although of minimal
gravity, i.e., although the possibility of the accident occurring is slight, if it did occur, the
probability is substantial that death or serious physical harm would result, See id. at 20,967.
See also National Realty & Constr, Co., [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs.
15,188, at 20,265-66 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 85).
56 OSHA § 5(a)(1), 19 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1970).
57 But cf. National Realty, 489 F.2d at 1266 n.37..
58 [1971-1973] CCH Occ. Safety & Health Dees. 11 15,501, at 20,786 (Review Comm'n
1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 83).
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a way that it came into contact with the electric cable, resulting in
the death of one employee. The Commission held that the respon-
dent could not reasonably have anticipated that his employees
would use the ladder in such a manner that it would come in contact
with or in close proximity to, the power line: the wires were
sufficiently removed from the building to pose no danger and no
unusual conditions existed at the site." The Commission majority
concluded that the possibility of serious death or injury from fur-
nishing the ladder under those conditions was "too remote" to find a
violation of the general duty clause. Therefore, the citation and
penalty were vacated.
In Hansen Brothers Logging," the Commission came closer to
directly dealing with the "free" from recognized hazards issue when
it adopted a "practicality" standard. 6 I The case concerned a logging
operation. Hansen was cited following an investigation of the acci-
dental death of an employee who had stepped into the swing radius
of a crane used as a log loader; the employee was struck by the
counter weight of the machine and was killed. Since no standards
covered the situation, the issue presented under the general duty
clause was whether the respondent had taken reasonable precau-
tions to keep employees out of the hazardous area created by the
rotation of the loader. In a rare unanimous opinion, the Commission
found that "practicality and reason" 62 required the conclusion that
the respondent had met this obligation on the bases that: (a) the
respondent gave specific oral instructions to stay clear of the loading
area while equipment was in motion and had repeatedly reminded
employees of this policy; (b) the hazard was obvious; and (c) there
was nothing to show that the respondent knew or reasonably should
have known that the employee ,would disobey company policy. 63
59
 See text at notes 59-61 infra. The Commission majority must have concluded that
there was nothing that the employer feasibly could have done to effectively prevent this
"unforeseen" occurrence. Nevertheless, Commissioner Van Namee thought that the eventual-
ity was highly foreseeable and would have found a violation. Id. at 20,788 (dissenting
opinion).
6° 11971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 1l 15,258, at 20,340 (Review Comm'n
1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 141).
61 Id. at 20,341.
62 Id.
63
 Id. Could not the same be said with respect to the circumstances surrounding the
accident in National Realty? See text at notes 15-19 supra. See also Chairman Moran's dissent
in Southern Soya Corp., CCH Empl. Safety & Health Guide 11 16,957, at 21,640 (Review
Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc, No. 515) (dissenting opinion). Southern Soya contains a fact
situation highly analogous to Hansen Bros. Logging, [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health
Decs. 15,258, at 20,340 (Review Comm'n 1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 141); see text at notes
60-64. Respondent in Southern Soya was cited for a violation of the general duty clause for
failure to furnish employees working in a cotton seed storage tank with a place of employment
free from a recognized hazard because they were exposed to a cave-in from undercut walls of
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The Commissioners further pointed out that "to require the respon-
dent to provide one-on-one supervision of its employees would place
respondent under the unreasonably burdensome duty of having to
establish the whereabouts of each of its employees prior to every
operation of its equipment." 64
In National Realty, the court set up a criterion of
"preventability" 65 for determining whether an employer had ren-
dered his workplace "free" of a hazard. "Preventability" was fur-
thermore limited within the confines of utility and feasibility." This
represents an important breakthrough in determining the limits of
the general duty clause: the Secretary must show that there were
recognized safety measures 67 that the employer could have taken
which were "demonstrably feasible" 68 and which "would have ma-
terially reduced the likelihood that such misconduct would have
occurred."69 If the employer's safety program is not feasibly
curable7 ° or if the accident-producing situation was "idiosyncratic
and implausible in motive or means," 71 then it was not preventable
and Congress could not have intended it to be "recognized" under
the clause. 72 Even though hazardous conduct may be recognized as
such, if incidents of the conduct are not "feasibly curable
inadequacies" 73 of the employer's safety program, the employer may
not be cited for violation of the clause when these isolated and
unpreventable incidents do occur. 74 A safety program may be
cotton seed. Southern Soya, supra, at 21,639, Chairman Moran found that the respondent
had a strict company rule prohibiting any person from leaving the safety tunnel and entering
the storage tank until the plant manager and foreman jointly determined that it was safe; that
no unauthorized employee was ever seen in the tank; that no infraction of the rule was ever
called to the respondent's attention; that there was no reason to foresee that an employee with
the company for 20 years would disobey the rule and enter the tank; and that the violation
occurred as a result of the employee's carelessness and heedlessness. Id. at 21,639-40 (dissent-
ing opinion). Nevertheless, on these facts, which are arguably more exculpatory than in
Arnold Hansen, the majority found a violation, although not one reason was given therefor.
b4 [1971-19731 CCH Occ. Safety & Health Decs. 15,258, at 20,340 (Review Comm'n
1972) (OSHRC Doc. No. 141). This sounds very much like the preventability-feasibility-utility
standard developed by the court in National Realty. See text at notes 65-75 infra. •
65 489 F.2d at 1266.
66 id. at 1267. See Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 988, 992 (1973).
67 The court impliedly spoke of safety measures which "conscientious experts, familiar
with the industry" would have taken into consideration "when prescribing a safety program"
for the employer. 489 F.2d at 1266. But the test of feasibility is not customariness. Id. at 1266
n.37,
65 Id. at 1267.
69 Id.
79
 This may require closing down the operation entirely. See Morey, supra note 66, at
992-93.
71 489 F.2d at 1266.
72 Id. See text at notes 9-13 supra.
73 Id, at 1267.
74 Id. at 1266.
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deficient to this degree and yet not be incompatible with the statu-
tory requirement that the workplace be maintained "free" of recog-
nized hazards. 75
It was with regard to this final element that the Secretary failed
to carry his burden of proof: he adduced no evidence as to definite
feasible and effective measures which National Realty could have
taken to prevent the hazard from existing at the construction site. 76
The court stated that the procedures which the Secretary claims that
the employer should have followed must be brought up at the
hearing so that the employer may have an adequate opportunity to
prepare a defense to the charges." Particularly unfair is the situa-
tion, as in National Realty, where the employer learns only at the
Commission review stage of the exact nature of the charges against
him and the deficiencies of his safety program. Furthermore, it is
not the function of the Review Commission to suggest ways in
which the employer could have avoided a violation. The commis-
sioners are not to act as "expert witnesses for the Secretary." 78 The
Secretary must outline the charges against the employer either in the
citation or by amendments to the citation at the hearing. 79 Thereaf-
ter, the three elements of the Secretary's burden of proof must be
proven by substantial evidence in order that a violation of the
general duty clause may properly be laid to the charge of the
employer.
National Realty requires the Secretary to prove that the em-
ployer failed to (a) render his workplace "free" of a hazard which
was (b) "recognized," and (c) "causing or likely to cause death or
serious physical harm."8 ° As more cases arising under the general
duty clause are litigated, the scope of the duty will doubtless become
more clearly defined. By clearly enumerating the elements in the
secretary's burden of proof, National Realty has brightened the path
to consistent and rational interpretation of the general duty clause of
OSHA.
75 Id. The fact that a fatality or an injury occurred is not prima fade proof that a
violation of the general duty clause existed. Id. at 1267. See note 55 supra.
76 Id. at 1267.
" Id.
78
 Id. at 1267 n.40.
79
 See note 27 supra. See also Ernest F. Donley's Sons, Inc., [1971-1973) CCH Occ.
Safety & Health Decs. 11 15,628, at 20,914-15 (Review Comm'n 1973) (OSHRC Doc. No. 43)
(dissenting opinion).
°° 489 F.2d at 1265.
1088
